50 to 60 percent of the soybeans, most of the commercial beef and dairy production, and around 60 percent of the poultry output. Between the two extremes are the "emergent farmers," who produce significantly for the market using appreciable quantities of modern inputs and cultivate an average of 10 to 20 hectares. The development of smallholder agriculture properly linked to the national market and global economy is a key policy objective. Various approaches are currently being tried, including the creation of commodity associations, contract farming, and a cottage seed industry.
Structural Change in the Zambian Economy, 1975-2000
During the 1980s, the World Bank proposed a program of liberalization, diversification, and privatization that was overshadowed by currency (and price) stabilization concerns and characterized by lack of domestic support for structural adjustment. An accumulation of arrears by the government led to a suspension of World Bank lending between 1987 and 1991. In 1991, Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) came to power on a platform of reform and accepted a number of structural adjustment measures.
The new government observed many of its fiscal and monetary obligations under adjustment lending between 1991 and 1994, with positive results on inflation and the budget. The adjustment away from the high-income copper economy was reflected in the decline in the government's share of the economy. The government had enjoyed a relatively high rate of tax collections (18.4 percent of GDP), to which foreign grants added another 8.3 percent of GDP for a high government share of 27 percent. The dependence on external funds became one of Zambia's problems (World Bank 2001) .
In 1994, the attention of the World Bank-a major external source of funding for the country-shifted to poverty alleviation, with emphasis on privatization and sectoral investment programs. In the early 1990s, the country experienced very high rates of inflation because of fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits caused by the losses of parastatal industries covered by the government. 1 Monetization of these deficits
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There followed a privatization of parastatal firms and a divestiture of underutilized public properties and productive facilities to intermediate public-private trusts. The rapid inflation of this period eroded the real value of salaries in the public service, including those of scientists in public research institutions. Inflation still hovers around 20 percent annually (which, although high, is far below rates in excess of 100 percent in the early to mid-1990s) .
The large change in the structure of the economy over the period 1979-99 is shown in Table 9 .2. Declines in the percentage of both industry and government consumption in GDP indicate how dependent the economy had been on copper revenues. The recent rise in the share of agriculture demonstrates a recovery of agricultural production and some movement into new crops. The food production index for the period 1997-2000 fluctuated around the base level of 1989-91, but agricultural productivity fell significantly. The recent rise in agriculture's share in GDP therefore appears more pronounced because of the relative decline of industry (Table 9 .2).
The population of Zambia is still growing at a rate of 2.2-2.4 percent annually, despite the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS. Largely because of the copper industry, Zambia was already 40 percent urbanized in 1980. This proportion has stayed relatively constant, with recent figures showing it rising to 44.5 percent in 2000 (World Bank 2002) . Zambia is also experiencing an unusual phenomenon of urban-to-rural migration, possibly related to the economic situation and the impact of HIV/AIDS.
Development of Agricultural Policy and the Impact of Structural Adjustment on Agriculture
The roots of current government policy for the agricultural sector are found in the Ministry of Finance's "Agricultural Sector Letter of Development Policy" (MFNP 1995) . This letter was an integral part of its request to the World Bank for the Agricultural Sector Investment Program (ASIP) funded by the International Development Association. In that letter, the government committed itself to actions to liberalize the economy and restrict the role of the state. Four other documents implicitly followed policies affecting agriculture and agricultural research. These include "Formulation of a National Seed and Research Policy" (MAFF 1998) , the draft National Agricultural Policy (MAFF 2000a) , and various drafts of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MFNP 2002) . Finally, proposals from 15 working groups preparing the ASIP successor program were synthesized in an agricultural commercialization program (ACP) (December 2001) that was scheduled for World Bank appraisal early in 2003.
In its 1995 letter on development policy, the Ministry of Finance agreed to the following specific policy thrusts:
1. Liberalize agricultural markets by relying on market-based prices for all crops, privatizing agricultural parastatals, and removing trade restrictions 2. Increase the role of the private sector by privatizing companies, seeking cost recovery, or privatizing services outright 3. Diversify agricultural production by shifting from maize to groundnuts, soybeans, tobacco, cotton, horticulture, and floriculture 4. Improve services to smallholders through research, extension, credit, and land tenure 5. Improve the economic status of women through access to credit, extension, land tenure, and other services 6. Make better use of available natural resources by accelerating land registration, increasing investment in infrastructure, and permitting land subdivision to create a market in land 7. Ensure food security by creating a food reserve for transitory insecurity and a financial mechanism to finance imports 8. Broaden rural finance by ensuring pluralism in provision of financial services through incentives to private-sector services
The Zambian government made some progress in implementing these commitments, with a few lacunae that had implications for agricultural research and development.
The Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Fisheries (MAFF) began preparing a full national agricultural policy (NAP) in early 2000. Insofar as they were discussed, the draft objectives for soil and crop research were a mix of general and specific topics covering appropriate technology and varieties, conservation farming, a focus on smallholders, and the participation of the private sector. In the livestock subsector, the primary objective was disease prevention and control through provision of services by the private sector. In fisheries, attention was expected to shift to aquaculture and production of fingerlings because capture fisheries were at their limit. The draft policy also mentioned instituting emergency-preparedness measures to mitigate the effects of drought, and programs for the prevention and control of crop pests and livestock diseases of national importance.
On the institutional side, the stated objectives were to develop an efficient private-sector marketing system, facilitate the development of farmer groups, and implement a seed policy to create a dynamic seed industry offering a reliable quantity and quality of seed. The intricacies of public-private sector collaboration are exemplified by the Zamseed case, discussed in the next section.
The donor group reaction to the draft National Agricultural Policy (MAFF 2001a) can be summarized as follows: 2 From among all the activities mentioned, the two priorities should be to link small-scale farmers to agro-industry and to reduce dependence on external inputs through better management practices, such as conservation farming. On principle, the government should stick to its core functions of regulation, facilitation, coordination, and monitoring so as not to crowd out the private sector. Moreover, concern with smallholders should not lead to neglect of large-scale farmers, who can make opportunities for smallholders through market creation, outsourcing, contract farming, and technical knowledge. Finally, certain types of support from donors and government could be made conditional on the adoption of environmentally friendly practices, such as conservation farming (Agricultural Consultative Forum 2001) .
These market-oriented views have found strong expression in the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP):
Zambia recognizes that future growth potential will be based on increased market competitiveness and that the liberalization process embarked on earlier is virtually irreversible if market players have to respond to the emerging structure and requirements of the global economy. In this regard, agricultural producers, processors, and merchandisers will be enabled to rapidly reposition themselves in the face of increasing competition, changing customer preferences, and new distribution channel designs. Both agricultural producers and agribusiness players will be en-couraged to produce competitively and reach out to emerging markets more proactively.
In this regard, one of the priorities will be to complete the policy reform agenda set at the beginning of the 1990s, and to ensure that institutions in the agricultural sector attain a capacity level that makes them responsive to their clients. To provide policy clarity that appears to have been lacking in the last few years and avoid confusion regarding some aspects of the sector, government will issue within a year after the adoption of the PRSP clear policies and guidelines regarding agricultural inputs and output markets, mainly fertilizer and maize, as these appear to be areas where policy inconsistencies have been observed. (MFNP 2002, p. 56 ).
The principal interventions in the three years of Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme implementation focus on improvements in the following areas: the finance and investment climate; the marketing, trade, and agribusiness climate; land and infrastructure development; technology development and dissemination (TDD); and a targeted support system for food security (MFNP 2002) . For the fourth intervention, the emphasis shifted to packaging and dissemination and away from technology development and research itself.
Several of the donors that were strong supporters of public-sector research in previous eras-for example, Sweden, the United States, the Netherlands, and Japan-have shifted their support in recent years to various projects linked to private-sector development, or channeled funding to agricultural projects managed through semipublic trusts. The draft "Formulation of a National Seed Policy" (MAFF 1998) provided a useful recognition of the role of public research in supporting the development of a domestic industry. More of this debate would have been a useful addition to the Agricultural Commercialization Programme and PSRP. As it stands, these documents have not adequately dealt with the importance of public research, the commitment of the government, and the role it should play in current debates on biosafety, the genetic modification of crops, and disaster preparedness-all issues that arose during the drought of 2002.
Implementation of the Structural Adjustment Policy, 1991-2001
At the macro level, budgeting under structural adjustment had a bias against the agricultural sector. There were also intrasectoral difficulties. The University of Zambia identified three major weaknesses in the implementation of structural adjustment in the agricultural sector (INESOR 1999) . These weaknesses, reiterated in the PSRP (MFNP 2002) , are the rapid pace of policy reforms without transitional mitigation measures, inadequate resource allocation for agricultural services, and unclear and inconsistent policy statements from politicians.
First, no provision was made to help marginal farmers adjust to the new market conditions: they were left to their own devices to bear the brunt of the policy shift, with resulting hardship and impoverishment. Second, public services such as research and extension were starved for resources to provide marginal farmers with technologies deemed more in line with new product prices and relative prices of factors of production. Support to field operations was neglected or left to donors, as can be seen from Table 9 .3 (World Bank 2001).
Third, government officials have given unclear and often contradictory signals to the private sector and other stakeholders on the long-term policy direction of the agricultural sector. In 2001, the government again became involved in the distribution of inputs through the Program against Malnutrition. The Food Pack Program provided free fertilizer and planting materials to the poor for a cereal, a legume, and a root crop. However, in an election year, it both crowded out the private sector and gave mixed signals on future policy.
The Impact of Adjustment: Recent Evolution in Production
Researchers at the Food Security Research Project (a joint project of MAFF and Michigan State University) have used census and postharvest survey data to iden-
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ELLIOTT AND PERRAULT tify trends in production and provide a quantitative look at the impact of the post-1991 agricultural reforms (Zulu et al. 2000) . They qualify the view that Zambian agriculture is in a decline. Their analysis shows change but no decline during the 1990s. They find, for example, that the national value of smallholder crop production shows no clearly discernible rise or fall during the mid-to late 1990s. Substantial reductions in areas under maize (22 percent), soybeans (60 percent), and sunflowers (70 percent) have been accompanied by equally impressive increases in areas under cotton (65 percent), groundnuts (76 percent), cassava (65 percent), and sweet potatoes (54 percent). Diversification, therefore, is taking place. This massive adjustment took place despite a series of extreme events: a countrywide drought in 1992, a partial drought in 1995, El Niño in 1998, and floods in 2001. The reform has not been harmful. The value of crop production has remained basically constant despite a reduction in government subsidies to agriculture. The Food Security Research Project also identified some distributional effects of the reforms. There is increased differentiation between farmers who have been able to adjust and those who have not. Access to land is a significant factor in the way farmers adapt: in 1997-98, the value of the crop output per capita produced by the top 25 percent of farmers, ranked by land quartile, was 8 to 10 times higher than the value of crop output per capita produced by the bottom 25 percent. The top 20 percent of farming households produce about 60 percent of the value of crop output. Others note that smallholders have reduced their purchased inputs for maize and returned to subsistence cultivation or turned to substitute crops, thereby increasing the burden on women (Copestake 1997, pp. 17, 49) . During this period of transition, the research system has been facing its own crisis and unable to take the lead in making needed changes.
The Evolution of Agricultural Research in Zambia The History of the Research System
Agricultural research in Zambia began in 1922 and has evolved in scale, scope, and focus since then. Key events (points of growth, reorganizations, and changes in focus) are summarized in Table 9 .4. The system began with a concern to serve European commercial farmers producing for the mining-sector labor force and a relatively urbanized population. It functioned essentially with expatriate staff. The first Zambian-national scientist was appointed only in 1967. During the 1970s and 1980s, the system, principally represented by the Soils and Crops Research Branch (SCRB) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, expanded with the aid of significant donor support and built an impressive record of achievements 238 ELLIOTT AND PERRAULT in new varieties and farming-systems research. It was retrenched as the support of donors declined. As a result of this expansion, both staff qualification ratios and expenditure per researcher were relatively high for African countries similar to Zambia. In 1991, the agricultural research intensity ratio (measuring agricultural research spending relative to the value of agricultural GDP) was above that of Malawi, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. However the gradual withdrawal of donor assistance in recent years occurred without compensatory support from the government. Together with changes in demand for research that occurred in tandem with the increasing liberalization of the economy, this lack of financial support has led to structural imbalances that the system has yet to address.
The Erosion of Research Capacity in Zambia
We have described the erosion of the current research capacity in Zambia as the "quiet crisis." It is quiet because it takes place against a positive chorus of achievements in liberalization and privatization while ignoring the simultaneous serious and perhaps permanent loss of institutional and human capacity.
A recent survey by ISNAR and IFPRI (ASTI 2001) reports on the institutional infrastructure for agricultural and related research (Table 9 .5). These data report full-time equivalent positions, not least because growth in the formal establishment of positions does not reflect the true research capacity. Many positions remain unfilled after staff departures, largely because of formal and informal hiring constraints; other staff nominally on indefinite leave are effectively departed, but their positions are not listed as vacant. The SCRB reported formal vacancies of around 25 percent in August 2002; a head count by the authors determined that even fewer staff were physically present. Other parts of the agricultural research and education sectors are also suffering. The 20 percent decline in research capacity in the university and related institutes reflects the growing teaching load, the unfilled vacancies, and the increase in consulting activities by faculty staff. The observed growth in private-sector involvement in research (for example by the cotton company Dunavant and the private seed companies) partially fills a vacuum created by the weakening of public research.
Both the institutional complexity of the agricultural knowledge system and the formal establishment numbers have grown over the past decade. However, the system's principal institution, SCRB, has weakened considerably. The loss of many of its senior staff has also led to a loss of institutional memory, understanding, and accumulated wisdom. As in many other African countries over the past few decades, the Zambian research system is in danger of losing its accumulated stock of scientific knowledge as scientists leave research and even the country itself (Pardey and Beintema 2001) . Moreover, the fragmentation of responsibility for research has made it more difficult to establish a strong and unified voice to advocate for the sector as each research and development body pursues its particular interest.
The ASTI series provides a long-term view of the evolution of the system. Information from the recent 2001 survey was linked to data from an earlier survey described by to indicate trends in the number of scientists and the amount of total expenditures and expenditure per scientist over the period (Figure 9 .2). The decline in real expenditures per researcher during the 1980s and 1990s results from a combination of declining real investments and the growth of staff emerging from training. In recent years, the system suffered attrition from staff departures and morbidity. Staff have left SCRB, in particular, for other sectors and nonresearch occupations with acceptable conditions of service; HIV/AIDS has also taken its toll, although no official figures are available to demonstrate it.
The incoming government (as of January 2002) published the 2002-04 PRSP and based its request to the World Bank on the Agricultural Commercialization Plan.
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SCRB: The Bellwether of the System
SCRB still employs the largest number of scientists in the country. The loss in its scientific resources observed in 2001 was not accompanied by a similar reduction in other staff categories with less mobility; the result was an imbalance in the staff mix, as shown in Table 9 .6. Within the scientific category, a de facto hiring freeze has led to an increasing number of vacancies in the agricultural research officer category. SCRB has too large a support staff for the number of scientists, and the latter are not optimally deployed to meet future demands for research. Spending limited financial resources on staff overheads while neglecting field sites is exacerbating the degradation of the physical infrastructure of the still-active stations.
Funding for the SCRB, part of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, has also suffered in recent years. As the largest component of the country's research system, SCRB reflects the state of the system as a whole. Table 9 .7 is a compilation of SCRB funding by source and use over the last decade of adjustment. The staff and funding patterns in Tables 9.6 and 9.7, combined with insights gained through field visits by the authors, point to several key problems. First, funding for research over the past decade experienced substantial year-to-year fluctuations, gaps between approved budgets and disbursements, and a decline in the real value of expenditures over time. Second, the decline in both resources and staff has not occurred in a strategic or purposeful way that reorganizes priorities, retains the best staff, and improves conditions of service and operating resources for those remaining. Third, at any given time, the operational support of SCRB has been heavily dependent on project-based support from a few key donors. When a donor closes its project, the affected research unit suffers significantly. With the advent of the Agricultural Sector Investment Program, the World Bank/IDA program took over a sustaining role previously played by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Closure of the ASIP program in December 2001, without a successor program in place, would have been paralyzing without the 2 million kwacha in bridging funds from the interim PRSP. Continued and direct support under the Agricultural Commercialization Programme is in question. 3 Although the bilateral donors have shifted their support away from purely public institutions, they are not necessarily abandoning the rural sector or even research in particular. They have continued to support activities of the semiprivate sector, NGOs, and agricultural development trusts. The tendency of bilateral donors to
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ELLIOTT AND PERRAULT eschew sectoral approaches and funding for government agencies owes much to their concern about the high levels of expenditure in MAFF's headquarters rather than out in the field. Shifting from institutional to project-based modes of support exacerbates the dependence of operational research on soft funding. This stance by the donors highlights how important it is for researchers and policymakers not only to reassert the nature of public-sector research as a core function of government but also to create governance structures for research that will restore the confidence of donors. The decline in commitment to research by the government may also reflect the lack of political pressure by farmers and other stakeholders in favor of research. Farmers may perceive their long-term individual benefits from research to be low compared with the immediate benefits of a school, dispensary, or rural feeder road. The benefits of public-good research in Zambia must be identified and publicized so that it can command attention and resources.
Other stakeholders of research (NGOs and development projects) have not been strong supporters of research. In some cases they have been vocal in criticizing the system for its lack of presence in the field or its lack of responsiveness when called upon. Though not always acknowledging their debt, NGOs and development projects have derived real benefit from the system in the form of advice, training, and access to planting materials. Both of the research trusts (explained below) and the university have grown by drawing human resources from the research and development system. The NGOs either hire staff away from the system or access human resources at partial cost to their programs by topping up the salaries of field staff in extension. Moreover, many former SCRB scientists have become either regular staff or frequent consultants to donor offices. The Soils and Crops Research Working Group for the ASIP successor program has made proposals for a decentralized, autonomous Zambia Agricultural Research Institute in line with government policies for reduction of poverty, public-private sector partnerships, decentralization, and participation by farmers' organizations. The proposals also satisfy donor needs for operational autonomy and accountability. Sustained commitment by the government is critical to develop and maintain the base on which the private sector can build. The level of funding requested is within the capability of the government and its donors.
Key Policy Issues
This section deals with macro-level and sectoral policy issues. Macro policy issues concern the need for a government commitment to maintain a research capacity to lead and support the goals laid out in the Agricultural Commercialization Programme (MAFF 2001b) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MFNP 2002) within the constraints of fiscal discipline. Sectoral policy issues concern the institutional and programmatic changes needed within the R&D sector to generate political and client support for research.
Fiscal Capacity and Commitment to Agricultural Research
Zambian fiscal policies and budgetary practices have been biased against agriculture (World Bank 2001). Despite the obvious importance of agriculture in employment and the agriculturally based share of manufacturing, the share of agriculture in public expenditures has been low, fluctuating between 2.5 and 10 percent but averaging only 4 percent between 1994 and 2000. This low priority cannot be explained away by the need for fiscal prudence alone, because expenditures were small relative to the quasi-deficits of state-owned enterprises. Within the agricultural budget, the share of research has been equally modest, at only 5.3 percent (World Bank 2001).
However, structural adjustment and correction of the quasi-fiscal deficits will not restore research funding to previous levels. Since all sectors have experienced reductions from previous peaks, it is necessary to establish agriculture's priority in terms of efficiency, equity, and implementability. To demonstrate efficiency, research must show that it will make the greatest impact relative to the counterfactual scenario-what would happen if the government did not spend the money to undertake this activity. To demonstrate equity, it must show that the research will help the poor, and-since poverty is widespread-that expenditure on research is a better way to help the poor (especially the rural poor) than other forms of expendi-ture. Finally, to demonstrate implementability, it must show that research is able to do what it promises (World Bank 2001).
Coordination and Control in the NARS
There are two aspects to the coordination of agricultural research in Zambia: the first is coordination of the components of the broader R&D system, and the second is coordination within the public research organization itself. Over the past decade, Zambia's national agricultural research system has grown in complexity but not in full-time equivalent (fte) scientist numbers or in research capacity. Meanwhile, there are more research partners: the university, the semipublic research trusts, the seed industry, and technology service providers such as extension and NGOs. Pluralism is generally a positive thing. However, the increase in the number of part-time research providers with primary mandates for education or development at the expense of the main research body, SCRB, weakens the research system. Three examples highlight the need for better coordination and guidance of the system.
In 1991, gray leaf spot of maize appeared in the country, probably via seed imported from other countries of the region. 4 The arrival of the fungus had grave consequences for national maize production because Zambian hybrids were found to be highly susceptible to it. Not only did some time elapse before the impact of this unregulated and untested technology importation was brought to the attention of research, but SCRB had few resources to respond to the threat. A strengthened Seed Control and Certification Institute (SCCI) with better control measures could have prevented the problem, and better coordination between SCRB and Zamseed (a joint public-private seed company described in more detail below) could have brought it under control much sooner.
The second example involves incentives and recognition for research contributions. Seeds and varieties provided freely by SCRB are marketed by some technology service providers without recognition of their SCRB origins. The absence of a mechanism for SCRB to earn revenue by charging royalties or a price for its basic seed, as well as the failure to give public credit to SCRB through brand recognition, deprives SCRB of needed political and financial support. MAFF is responsible for setting policies that create incentives for both research and development projects under its purview.
Finally, SCRB is hampered in its efforts to involve farmers in its technologydevelopment efforts by the practice of some NGOs that pay sitting fees, missedlunch allowances, and other allowances to attract farmers to their technologydiffusion sessions. Because this practice is not uniform among donor projects, some donors who do not pay such allowances also complain about their inability to compete with those that do. These three examples highlight the need to coordinate efforts among those involved in technology generation and transfer activities within the agricultural sector.
There are also coordination problems within the official ministerial structures. Governance and management of public R&D efforts have been fragmented among the ministries concerned with agriculture, education, and science and technology. Within MAFF, research functions are divided among several departments and located at different levels within departments. In 1997, the government of Zambia passed a Science Policy Act that created the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). This legislation provided for the transfer of agricultural research from MAFF to the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Vocational Education. However, this decision was opposed within MAFF and by researchers and has never been implemented.
The official functions of the NSTC are to promote science, regulate research, advise the government on science policy, and mobilize resources. NSTC also claims an implicit fifth mandate, to "coordinate science activities" (including agricultural research). The debate over its mandate remains open. Would NSTC do a better job coordinating agricultural research with other scientific endeavors? Has MAFF failed to create the necessary synergies between research and development activities within its own sector? Would NSTC be able to do this?
The lack of integration of livestock research with soils and crops research can also be seen as a coordination problem within the ministry, with consequences for research agendas. Uncomfortable in a crops-dominated institute, livestock researchers requested to be separated from SCRB. When they became a unit in the Animal Production and Health Branch, they found that research took second place to operational activities. This isolation of research units in separate "silos" also describes the situation of the Livestock Pest Research Center, which falls outside MAFF under the National Institute for Science and Industrial Research Center (Ministry of Science and Technology). Likewise, aquaculture research stands apart from agricultural research under the Fisheries Research Branch of MAFF.
The Working Group on Soils and Crops Research argued for closer integration of soils, crop, livestock, and aquaculture research in its submission to the ACP team. Its argument depends on the complementarities of these research activities at the farm level, and on the cost of maintaining a meaningful research infrastructure in the different ecological areas. Unfortunately, the Agricultural Commercialization Plan did not address the structural issues, notably the complementarity of crops livestock and fisheries at the farm and local levels, the necessary relationship to MAFF to achieve synergies, and the degree to which the autonomy of research branches may serve both operational and donor-financing goals.
Public-Private Sector Collaboration: The Seed Industry
As illustrated by the gray leaf spot problem, the development of a vibrant and responsive seed sector involves a proper regulatory framework, cooperation between the public and private sectors, and close relations with the informal as well as formal seed multiplication projects. The seed industry could be seen as both a scientific partner and a source of financial support for agricultural research. Relations between research and Zamseed, the public-private joint venture mentioned above, provide several insights into the potentials and the pitfalls.
The Zambian seed industry has undergone a number of transformations since the liberalization of 1991, which have been aimed at converting it from a publicly controlled sector into a mixed public and private sector, comprising a formal and an informal subsector. The formal sector includes the public research entities (SCRB and the Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust, known as GART) and the commercial seed companies. The commercial seed companies can be broken down further into a domestic component (Zamseed and MRI Seed) and a foreign component (Pannar and SeedCo, which have parent companies in South Africa and Zimbabwe, respectively). 5 The informal seed sector involves systems of production, distribution, and marketing involving NGOs operating at the community level, small companies, and importers. The Seed Control and Certification Institute (SCCI) is expected to provide quality control to the industry.
Zamseed is struggling to maintain its strategic role as the primary supplier of seed to smallholders, even in a period of liberalization. Zamseed was created as a private company in 1980 with support from Sida; 40 percent of its shares are owned by the Government of the Republic of Zambia and the rest by its Swedish partners Svalölof Weibull AB and Swedfund International AB. 6 Since that time, the partners have increased their shares to a majority interest. During the 1980s, Sida provided major support to SCRB, notably to the programs for cereals, roots, and tubers and for pasture breeding, while the Swedish seed company had a contract to provide technical assistance to both Zamseed and the research system. Thus there were very close connections between research, Zamseed, and their common donor. Research was relatively well funded during this period. Sida helped develop the facilities at Golden Valley through financial assistance and breeders attached to SCRB. When Sweden withdrew its support to SCRB, it was hoped that the newly created GART would assume the breeding functions of SCRB and would be supported by commercial agriculture. This development has not occurred. One result of this hiatus in attention to breeding was the gray leaf spot incident discussed above.
The seed industry offers the potential for only partial cost recovery by an SCRB breeding program. Even for a strategic crop like maize, a donor subsidized the major development costs, while the small size of the domestic market was artificially enhanced by price policies that encouraged hybrid maize. Until the liberalization policy, the market for hybrid maize was significant and growing.
In that favorable context, SCRB and Zamseed negotiated a royalty agreement in return for exclusive rights to SCRB varieties. However, the final agreement came only in 1993, just when the market was being liberalized and the demand for hybrids fell dramatically. Although demand for open-pollinated varieties (OPVs) increased, these offered a much lower potential for cost recovery, as farmers, to reduce their own costs, did not renew their seed stock annually. Moreover, SCRB varieties (OPV, seedlings, and cuttings) faced the increasing competition that accompanied market liberalization. Finally, Zamseed suffered both increased competition and poor repayment of deliveries to NGOs and government programs. As a result, Zamseed did not pay royalties, and their nonpayment became the subject of strained relations with SCRB.
The informal seed sector also compounds the problems of creating a dynamic and reliable commercial seed sector. Both researchers and the Seed Control and Certification Institute point to large-scale, uncontrolled, and unmarked imports of seeds. These present potential disease risks as well as disruption of domestic policy. Until a code of conduct-with enforceable intellectual property rights and associated use-rights contracts-is adopted for the informal sector, the private sector will make little contribution to funding research through the purchase of planting materials.
The Trusts: Public-Private Partnerships
With the active support of bilateral donors, the Zambian government has overseen the formation of several autonomous trusts with greater and lesser research mandates. 7 The three most relevant and recent trusts for agricultural research are GART (created in 1997), the Cotton Development Trust (created in 1999), and the Livestock Development Trust (created in 2002).
Rationales for the creation of trusts vary. They may permit a much higher level of commercialization within undertakings traditionally managed by the public sector; allow the government to transfer physical assets and human resources into more cost-effective arrangements; provide an alternative development funding option for donors; create strong linkages between the public and private sector; and provide a politically acceptable method of introducing commercialization and privatization (MAFF 2000b) .
The government creates a trust by devolving publicly owned assets to a mixed public-and private-sector board. The trusts have generally benefited from significant reinvestment by donors to prepare them for their mission. Because of their autonomous status and their relative financial independence, the trusts have been able to pay salaries to their staff comparable to those of locally recruited experts of UN organizations. However, their immediate advantage is clearly that they are an alternative funding option for donors who want to support agriculture but do not want to put money in a government department.
Golden Valley Agricultural Research Trust (GART).
GART has a broad mandate to support agriculture and has been successful at exploiting opportunities for projects. Early concerns were that it would not serve resource-poor farmers and would focus on its commercial farm base. In fact, it has hosted donor-funded projects focusing on smallholders: a project of the Zambian National Farmers' Union focusing on conservation farming, and a second to develop a model agroforestry-based farm. On the other hand, GART is sometimes criticized domestically for failing to take over the breeding of key crops demanded by the emerging informal seed sector and commercial farmers. Without saying what is cause and what is effect, we observe that there has been negligible private-sector financial support for GART.
Golden Valley supports some of its overheads by the commercial production of maize and soybeans. Under the best of circumstances, GART could generate a profit to be invested in research, but this alone will not be sufficient to fund research even on the scale expected by its broad mandate. GART receives compensation for hosting donor projects and recognition for its managerial flexibility and entrepreneurship. It has served as a good vehicle for keeping donor funds in the agricultural sector as they are withdrawn from government departments. It may have a future role as a flexible vehicle for facilitating and maintaining donor support to the research system through contract research, including subcontracting projects to SCRB, which normally should be the intellectual leader of the system.
Cotton Development Trust (CDT).
CDT is a more typical example of a singlecommodity research institute with potential for strong industry support. However, the government has yet to pass legislation mandating a cess on ginning or marketing. Legislation is moving slowly through the bureaucratic and political processes. In the meantime, the industry has made symbolic contributions to CDT and formally supports a cess of some type.
A few key issues must be resolved before CDT will be on a sound footing. Key members of the industry believe that the government cannot devolve all responsibility for cotton research onto the industry. First, there remains long-term, publicgood research that requires continued public support. Second, the structure of the industry does not create the proper incentives necessary for it to assume collective responsibility for research. The cotton industry is characterized by a few major companies that are willing to invest in outgrower capacity and maintenance of brandname quality, along with a number of smaller firms with short-term perspectives.
The two groups have quite different market behavior and willingness to invest in R&D. 8 For example, Dunavant Zambia Ltd. carries out research locally, draws on support from its affiliate in South Africa, and runs a strong outgrower scheme with a database of 120,000 farmers. However, its predecessor, Lonrho, found that new entrants to the liberalized cotton market did not provide extension or carry out research but then purchased the output of Lonrho farmers at a premium. As a result of this effective piracy, Lonrho suffered a low rate of loan recovery and did not capture sufficient cotton to run its ginneries at capacity. With falling world prices, it could not recover its development costs. In response, Lonrho first cut its extension staff and then sold the company.
Dunavant is reviving the outgrower program. To solve the extension and credit problem, Dunavant will provide inputs and credit to some 55,000 to 75,000 farmers through a network of distributors, who are themselves cotton farmers, responsible for a group of 40 farmers cultivating an average of 1.5 hectares each. These distributors provide their farmers with inputs and technical support on behalf of the company. Depending on each distributor's loan-recovery rate, the level of credit in the subsequent year will be increased.
Dunavant is in principle favorable to a public-private partnership. It is willing to contract with CDT for research services, training for its agents, and seed multiplication. However, it argues that the public sector has a responsibility to commit to long-term research. Moreover, the industry and government must come to grips with the excess ginning capacity that encourages piracy. It must design and legislate an effective and efficient levy on exports and domestic sales that goes into a research fund for the maintenance of research capacity.
Livestock Development Trust (LDT).
The creation of the LDT was assisted by the Netherlands, which has continued to support it during an establishment period. In the long run, LDT hopes to support itself through its commercial activities, special services (especially training), and public-good research contracted by various donors. The promoters of the trust also hope to generate funds for public-good research from their operating profits through a conglomerate of former public properties (not all revenue-earning).
The experience from the cases of Zamseed and the trusts leads to several conclusions. First, their autonomy of operation and attractive conditions of service genuinely encourage initiative; however, these are not sufficient conditions for sustainability. Second, the structure of the parent industry clearly affects its willingness to fund research. For example, GART, which has a broad mandate and no single client, is consequently open to donor projects of various types; CDT's survival will be dependent on the industry's final agreement to accept a cess. Third, trusts may require continued public support. Even a single-commodity institute may claim public support on the basis of the public part of its agenda or for its attention to the needs of smallholders. Fourth, concerns by the trust with the commercial success of its operation will lead some stakeholders to reproach them for weakness in capacity or lack of attention to research. Finally, the current donor attention to the trusts and relatively high salaries paid by the trusts, while motivating, cannot be generalized to the whole research system. The trusts will thrive to the degree that they remain focused, responsive to clients (industry or donor), and agile in meeting commercial needs. However, they run the risk of thereby failing to meet the needs of poor farmers in most of the country, outside the most accessible places, and to deal with public-good issues, such as environmentally sustainable farming practices.
Demand-Responsive Research following Structural Adjustment
Until the structural-adjustment years of the 1990s, SCRB and its partners responded well to prevailing policies and market conditions. Highly subsidized maize and input prices induced the development of a high-input agriculture that was seen as a vehicle for the transformation of smallholder agriculture and the appropriate response to feed the urban industrial centers, especially when the investments to bring the smallholder into the market economy were not made (roads, access to land, and market infrastructure in the countryside). Research institutions (such as SCRB and the University of Zambia) could have voiced their concern about this development strategy had the environment been conducive to such policy debate, and providing they had the capacity for policy analysis. This situation illustrates the need for the research establishment to have access to a strong policy-analysis capacity to contribute to the national debate on development issues, particularly as they affect the research agenda. Given the difficulty of maintaining in-house socialscience capacity, most agricultural research institutes would be better off establishing good partnerships or contracting the necessary policy work in their respective domains to specialized institutes of the University of Zambia.
Research will have to shape its agenda and develop new forms of collaboration to respond to the changing development environment (see Chapter 1, this volume) . While GART and CDT are well placed to meet the needs of particular farmers (large commercial farmers and cotton farmers, respectively) the SCRB will be expected to attend to long-term public-good issues focusing on the needs of resourcepoor farmers, developing appropriate responses for sustainable production, maintaining the genetic resources bank, and conducting some long-term strategic research. Proper collaborative modes need to be developed between research partners so that the derived demand for SCRB is properly expressed and supported financially.
Addressing the needs of poor smallholders is potentially a core function for the public research system. They represent a much less attractive target group for private research. Smallholders have more limited means to purchase inputs, they operate in a variety of environments with smaller application domains for research results, and they generally have more limited market opportunities. Research on behalf of such farmers will be not only riskier but also costlier.
Strengthening the role of farmer organizations to articulate demands for research and to channel donor funding is an expressed goal of the PRSP and ACP. Research will also have to develop new partnerships with other technology service providers operating at the field level so that technologies are appropriate and well supported, and costs are recovered when possible.
Finally, SCRB should also be positioning itself to play a pivotal role in issues of public policy where agriculture is central. Such issues include biosafety and the importation of genetically modified food; preparing for extreme natural events such as floods, droughts, and climate-induced changes; and addressing the links between agriculture and HIV/AIDS, including gender implications.
The above considerations were the basis for the recommendation of the ASIP working group to continue support for public research focusing essentially on the smallholder and operating in a decentralized mode in each of the principal agroecological zones of the country, in close collaboration with farmers and technology service providers.
Lessons Become Proposals for System Reform and Sustainability
The foregoing discussion has traced the evolution of a relatively small research system with an important role to play in enhancing productivity of the Zambian economy and lifting large numbers of the rural poor out of poverty. The country's research and development system has faced change before. Following independence, the system shifted from one serving primarily white commercial farmers to one serving the wider community, and, thanks to a solid performance by its farming systems research program, it offered a better understanding of smallholder agriculture and appropriate practices and planting materials. Aided by donors and technical assistance, agricultural research became strong and responded to the needs of the time, which were largely defined by an inappropriate agricultural policy.
It adapted less well to the changes that occurred in the 1990s, mainly because the changes in development policy were more fundamental, and the necessary supporting institutional changes were not anticipated and acted on. The research system became reactive rather than proactive in the changing environment. It is imperative that the research system develop the policy-analysis capacity to allow institutions to understand how their environment is changing, voice their concerns on societal choices, and make necessary adjustments.
Over the past decade, the number and diversity of institutions engaged in agricultural research, development, and education have grown, and they will continue to grow. Public-private partnerships in research will emerge in areas where cost recovery is easiest, as with cotton. Private agencies in technology transfer will add their flexibility of operation to find new modes to serve the resource-poor farmer, given donor and government support. With proper links to regional and international research, the latter is expected to play a more significant role as national research draws more heavily on experiences in similar agroecological environments abroad in its own efforts to borrow, copy, and adapt. This change in the institutional landscape should be beneficial if proper coordination mechanisms are set up to limit rent-seeking behaviors over attribution of benefits or improper service practices.
A public research organization refocused on societal objectives of poverty reduction and environmental sustainability will not be cheaper than the present system. It will require a decentralized structure that operates in innovative ways, close to its stakeholders, associating farmers, and technology service providers in all aspects of technology development, and which trains and advises staff on the proposed technologies. Although some of these services may be provided for a fee, thus reducing the burden of research on the national treasury, the most important aspects of this decentralization may be that research will become more demanddriven and focused on the needs of the resource-poor farmer, and that it increases the visibility of research and extension in the minds of farmers, thereby contributing to building a national consensus to support public research through general tax revenues and the like.
The Working Group on Soils and Crops Research built these considerations into its proposal for support under the Agricultural Commercialization Programme. The proposal calls for the creation of a demand-responsive and decentralized system for technology generation based on an autonomous Zambian Agricultural Research Institute (ZARI). ZARI would cover the main agroecological zones through a network of eight or nine zonal agricultural research stations (ZARSs). Each station would have a critical minimum number of staff capable of three functions: participating in national commodity and global thematic research, undertaking research related to farming systems to understand and help farmers of the zone, and actively developing linkages and outreach activities to NGOs, communitybased organizations, extension, and farmer organizations.
The demand for research will come through enhanced scientific partnerships, closer links with clients, and a demonstrated capacity to address emerging issues proactively. However, ensuring sustainable capacity requires upfront commitment from the government, expressed through clear policy statements, prioritization of research, rapid action on governance issues affecting donors, and adequate resources to ensure the retention and productivity of scientists.
Notes
7. and Benyon et al. (1998, Chapter 6) describe various commoditytrust arrangements in Zimbabwe.
8. Alston and Pardey (1996) describe the effects that industry structure has on the incidence of the costs and benefits from research, which influence the incentives for industry to pay directly for agricultural R&D.
